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An Alternative Set Model of Cognitive Jump
Kiri Sakahara∗ Takashi Sato†
Abstract
When we enumerate numbers up to some specific value, or, even if we
do not specify the number, we know at the same time that there are much
greater numbers which should be reachable by the same enumeration, but
indeed we also congnize them without practical enumeration. Namely,
if we deem enumeration to be a way of reaching a number without any
“jump”, there is a “jump” in our way of cognition of such greater numbers.
In this article, making use of a set theoretical framework by Vopeˇnka [9]
(alternative set theory) which describes such structure, we attempt to shed
light on an analogous sturucture in human and social phenomenon. As an
example, we examine a problem of common knowledge in electronic mail
game presented by Rubinstein [6]. We show an event comes to common
knowledge by a “cognitive jump”.
1 Introduction
Asked about how many sands are there in a shore, what would the answer be?
Some may figure out a rough estimate effortlessly. But most of us would not be
able to give even a single guess and feel that it is too many to count, almost as
infinite.
Every time we try to count the very huge pile of objects, this kind of feeling
would be revived. The word infinity may not express any estimates nor specific
numbers but do this impossibility itself of achieving the task within any given
time. It may be possible to count them all somehow, but, in most cases, we
helplessly jump to the conclusion that there is infinite grain of sands.
It is this kind of impossibility which marks not only our own intuitive under-
standing of it but the way mathematics construct infinity in its system. Infinite
sets are understood to be the ones which cannot be reached by any inductive
operations. To be more precise, it is stated that there exists an inductive set
which includes all successors of its elements besides empty set, so that the set
cannot be successors of any elements of it and, thus, is closed under induction.
While this construction opens the way to deal with infinite calculus in set
environment, some problematic sides also surface gradually when they are ap-
plied to model some real-life situations. The one we focus here is the problem
how it is possible that some informations to become common knowledge.
This problem has been considered and dealt within a standard set environ-
ment, or Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. However, it seems that the problem stems
not from the way we handle the problem, but from the very way a standard set
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theory deals with infinity itself. In fact, by reconsidering the way we handle in-
finity from an alternative view, it is possible to solve the problem very smooth
and natural way as we shall see.
In the present paper, we examine one of the problematic sides of how a stan-
dard set theory deals with infinity along with the problem of common knowledge
building and offer a new way to handle infinite phenomenons.
2 Preliminaries
Our framework is built in a universe of alternative set theory (AST), which is
originated and developed by Vopeˇnka [9] to construct a set theoretical envi-
ronment in which one can deal with the phenomena involving infinitely many
repetitions in accordance with one’s own intuitive understanding, or phenomeno-
logical view [9], of them. Having unique and attractive structure, it is almost
forgotten, so we first overview its characteristic features and corresponding ax-
ioms before describing our framework1.
AST differs from Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZF) mainly in the way it
treats infinity. While ZF treats infinity as, say, actual infinity, AST deems it
as subjective infinity, or natural infinity [8] in his own words. This difference is
reflected in the way it constructs hierarchy between sets and classes.
ZF postulates an axiom of infinity, which assumes the existence of inductive
set, which contains all successors of its elements, while AST does not. Instead,
AST requires existence of infinite proper classes, so-called semisets, and infinite
sets are defined as the sets which include semisets as its subclasses.
This unique structure permits AST to model non-standard framework of
arithmetic, which include, for example, huge natural numbers, in an intuitively
sound way. Huge natural numbers are defined as the number which is bigger
than any finite natural number. However, the entire collection of finite natural
number cannot be, or at least seems not to be, described explicitly, so that the
class of all finite natural numbers cannot form a set, it remains only a class.
Consequently, every huge number, which itself is a set, must include a proper
class as its subclass, or, a semiset.
In fact, the predicate huge can properly be used only when some subjects are
there to use it in a proper manner. This subjective aspect of hugeness can only
be properly grasped when we regard infinity as some sort of subjective notion.
Our framework depends on this structure: the existence of the huge numbers,
or, infinity in our daily life. Taking into account of this structure, we cast a new
light on how to interpret our own judgement made in everyday life, and propose
a new way to model these judgement.
We start with the axiom of existence of sets. For notational ease, we use a
notation Set(x) to mean “x is a set”.
Axiom of existence of sets (empty set and set-successors)
Set(∅) ∧ (∀x) (∀y)Set(x ∪ {y})
To introduce further axioms we formally define set-formulas as usual. Set-
formulas are built up from two types of set-formulas x = y and x ∈ y, where x
1We consult Vopeˇnka and Trlifajova´ [10] as a reference here.
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and y are sets, by means of five connectives (ϕ ∧ ψ) , (ϕ ∨ ψ) , (ϕ⇒ ψ) , (ϕ ≡ ψ),
¬ (ϕ) and two quantifiers (∃x)ϕ, (∀x)ϕ, where ϕ and ψ are set-formulas.
Axiom of induction
Let ϕ (x) be a set-formula. Then
ϕ (∅) ∧ (∀y)
(
ϕ (x)⇒ ϕ (x ∪ {y})
)
⇒ (∀x)ϕ (x)
Sets in AST are generated inductively by these axioms in a concrete way.
Alongside with these axioms, AST also introduces extensionality for sets and
regularity, while pairing, union, power set, schema of separation and replacement
axioms are omitted, since these axioms can be derived from these axioms. Notice
that the axioms for sets coincide with that of ZF’s except that the axiom of
infinity is negated as we saw above.
In contrast, classes are only postulated.
Axiom of existence of classes
For each property ϕ, there exists the class {x ; ϕ(x)}
If ϕ(x) is a set-formula then we say that the class {x ; ϕ(x)} is set-theoretically
definable. For classes, the axiom of extensionality is also stated. We denote
classes in upper case X,Y, ... and sets in lower case x, y, ....
Semisets are defined as subclasses of sets. The existence of the special kind
of semisets is guaranteed by the next axiom. The notation Sms(X) means “X
is a semiset.”
Axiom of existence of proper semisets
There is a proper semiset. In Symbols,
(∃X) (Sms (X) ∧ ¬Set (X)) .
The existence of proper semisets implicitly premises some largeness of sets
which include proper semisets as their subclasses. If sets are small enough to
look inside and check their contents, they can be identified, and every subclasses
must be sets. On the other hand, when a set consists of infinitely many contents,
exactly how many elements are included remains indeterminate, so that some
subclasses cannot be sets: they must be semisets.
The finiteness and infinity in AST are defined in accordance with this intu-
ition. A class X is finite (notation: Fin(X)) iff each subclass of X is a set. On
the other hand, a class is infinite iff it includes proper semisets. Additionally,
a class X is called countable iff X is infinite class with a linear ordering ≤ such
that each segment {y ∈ X | y ≤ x} is finite.
The prolongation axiom
For each countable function F , there is a set function f such that F ⊆ f .
This axiom leads to existence of infinite sets. Since every function whose
domain is proper semiset can be prolonged to the function whose domain is
the set which include the semiset as its subclass, the domain of this function
forms an infinite set. But cardinality of infinite sets is differentiated from that
of semisets. This premise is stated in the next axiom. To state the axiom, we
introduce a relation between two classes. Two classes X , Y are equivalent iff
there is a one-one mapping X onto Y , i.e. X ≈ Y .
Axiom of cardinalities
For all infinite classes X, Y if both X and Y are not countable then they are
equivalent. This cardinality is called uncountable.
3
Evidently from the axiom, any infinite class is countable or uncountable. In
addition to them, the axiom of choice is also adopted.
In this environment of AST, a model of Peano arithmetic can be built. The
class of natural numbers N is defined, as usual, in the von Neumann way.
N =
{
x ;
(∀y ∈ x) (y ⊆ x)
∧ (∀y, z ∈ x) (y ∈ z ∨ y = z ∨ z ∈ y)
}
The class of finite natural numbers FN consists of the numbers represented
by finite sets.
FN = {x ∈ N ; Fin(x)}
We also name N \ FN as the class of huge natural numbers.
Apparently from the definition, FN is countable, and each huge natural
number, which include FN as its semiset, is an uncountable set. It is also
evident that N is an uncountable proper class. Since FN is a semiset, N \ FN
has no least element with respect to ⊆ such as ω, the least transfinite ordinal
number of ZF.
Lastly, we introduce a structure having essentially the same feature of semisets:
a σ-equivalence [3]. σ-equivalence is defined as the equivalence generated from
the union of countably many set-theoretically definable classes. It is introduced
originally, in Guricˇan and Zlatosˇ [3], as topological structure to decide whether
any given pair of sets are accessibile or not, and named as accessibility equiva-
lence. We use this equivalence later to assess accessibility between two states.
Definition 1. A class X is a σ-class if X is the union of a countable sequence of
set-theoretically definable classes. A class

↔ is a σ-equivalence if

↔ is a σ-class
and an equivalence relation. A sequence (Rn)n∈FN is a generating sequence of
an equivalence

↔ iff the following conditions hold:
(1) For each n, Rn is a set-theoretically definable, reflexive, and symmetric
relation.
(2) For each n and each x, y, z, 〈x, y〉 ∈ Rn and 〈y, z〉 ∈ Rn implies 〈x, z〉 ∈
Rn+1 (Rn ◦Rn ⊆ Rn+1) ;R0 = {〈x, x〉; for all x}.
(3)

↔ is the union of all the classes Rn.
Even when each relationRn is not an equivalence, the union of them becomes
an equivalence (since for every couple of pairs 〈x, y〉 ∈ Rn and 〈y, z〉 ∈ Rn there
always exists 〈x, z〉 ∈ Rn+1, thus transitivity is satisfied). An equivalence

↔ is
called totally disconnected iff it is generated by an equivalence relation Sn for
each n.
Given a σ-equivalence

↔, the equivalent class of any given set x can be
formed, which is called a galaxy of a set x denoted as gal(x) ≡ {y ∈ X ; x

↔ y}.
Almost immediately from the definition, galaxies are σ-class.
When the equivalence

↔ is totally disconnected, all galaxies are separated;
there are no continuum line, or

↔-chain, between two different galaxies. On the
other hand, if it is not, there may be a

↔-chain starting from any given set x
and reaching out to the other set y which is not in the galaxy gal(x) anymore.
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It is noteworthy that there appears to be one of the characteristic, and little
bit strange, structures of AST present here. Provided that transitivity is valid,
every element contained in one galaxy cannot go outside of it no matter how far
it traces along any sequence of any chain under the normal ZF settings since it
is equivalent to the first one. But in AST, it is possible that the first one is not
equivalent anymore after it traces huge steps. This is the structure we focus on
in the present paper. We will explore its characteristics in the next section.
3 Sorites Relation
To highlight the feature of the accessibility equivalence more concrete way, we
make use of sorites relation, mentioned in Tsujishita [7]. Let R be a binary
relation. A sequence (a1, . . . , aα) where α ∈ N \ FN is called an R-chain if
aiRai+1 for i ∈ α (and ai 6= aj for all i 6= j).
Definition 2. R is called a sorites relation iff R is equivalence relation and
there is an R-chain (a1, . . . , aα) that is ¬(a1Raα) for some α ∈ N \ FN .
Then, our claim is stated as the next theorem.
Theorem 1. There is a σ-equivalence

↔ that is a sorites relation.
Proof. Let us start with defining a distance between two elements aℓ and am
of a sequence (ai)i∈N as ||αℓ, αm|| = |m− ℓ|. We define a relation Rn for each
n ∈ FN as
Rn ≡ {〈ai, aj〉 ; ||ai, aj || < 2
n}.
It is obvious that
⋃
n∈FN Rn is a σ-class and {Rn ; n ∈ FN } is a generating
sequence of an equivalence

↔, since for every i, j, ||ai, aj || = ||aj , ai||, thus every
Rn satisfies symmetry. Since ||ai, ai|| = 0 ∈ FN , it also satisfies reflexivity. Let
〈x, y〉 ∈ Rn and 〈y, z〉 ∈ Rn. By definition of Rn, ||x−y|| < 2n and ||y−z|| < 2n,
thus, ||x− z|| ≤ ||x− y||+ ||y − z|| < 2× (2n) = 2n+1. It means 〈x, z〉 ∈ Rn+1.
Let us next confirm the union of all the classes Rn constructed above is a
sorites relation. Let α be a huge natural number which satisfies α = 2γ for some
γ ∈ N \ FN . For any i ∈ α, ai

↔ ai+1 by definition. But ||a1, aα|| = 2
γ − 1,
thus 〈a1, aα〉 /∈ Ri for all i ∈ FN , and ¬(a1

↔ aα).
Let us overview two basic properties of sorites relations. Throughout the
rest of the paper, all accessibility equivalences

↔ are supposed to be sorites
relations unless they are specified.
Proposition 1. If a1

↔ ai then a1

↔ ai+1.
Proof. Since (a1, . . . , aα) is

↔-chain, ai

↔ai+1 for all i ∈ α. a1

↔ ai+1 follows
by transitivity.
Proposition 2. If ¬
(
a1

↔ ai
)
then ¬
(
a1

↔ ai−1
)
.
Proof. Suppose a1

↔ ai−1, then a1

↔ ai follows since ai−1

↔ ai. It contradicts
the assumption.
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As a direct result of these two propositions, a peculiar property of galaxies is
drawn: for any given sorites sequence (a1, ..., aα) and within any finite number
of steps, an cannot go outside of gal(a1), or, conversely, penetrate into gal(aα).
The more peculiar property, which we mentioned in previous section, results
when we ask exactly how many steps it takes to go across the border of a galaxy.
The answer cannot be specified. Provided conversely that it takes, say β < α
steps, then aβ ∈ gal(a1) but aβ+1 /∈ gal(a1). It contradicts the Proposition 1.
It is strange. But it is the way AST comprehends numbers. The border can
be crossed, but we happen to know it only after some steps are taken outside the
border. Tsujishita named this property of semisets, after well-known features
in non-standard analysis [5], as overspill principle.
4 A Problem of Building Common Knowledge
Sorites relations are useful when we try to capture certain types of structures
where recurrences of the same procedures occur. The example we focus here
on is the structure of common knowledge. The specific aspect we want to
inquire about common knowledge can be summarized as the question: how many
messages does it take for some informations to become common knowledge? The
answer we will provide is huge.
To formalize structure of knowledge, we follow Aumann [1]’s framework for
set theoretical environment. Let Ω be a set, and P1 and P2 be its partition.
For every ω ∈ Ω let
Pi ≡ {〈ω, Pi〉; ω ∈ Pi and Pi ∈ Pi} .
Then, for any given ω ∈ Ω, an event E is called common knowledge at ω if E
includes the member of the meet P1∧P2 which contains ω, that is, P1∧P2(ω) ⊆
E where P1 ∧P2(ω) ∈ P1 ∧P2.
The condition of E’s being common knowledge can be put in other equiv-
alent way. Let P1,P2, · · · ,Pk, where k ∈ FN , be a sequence of subsets of Ω
satisfying P1 = P1(ω) and Pn = Pi where Pi ∈ Pi and Pn−1 ∩ Pi 6= ∅, where
i = 2 if n is even and i = 1 otherwise (the sequence is not unique since there
may be multiple Pis which satisfy Pn−1 ∩ Pi 6= ∅). ω′ ∈ Ω is reachable from
ω ∈ Ω if ω ∈ P1 and ω′ ∈ Pk. Then the statement that E is common knowledge
at ω ∈ Ω can be stated equivalently as E includes all the states ω′ which are
reachable from ω.
A concept of common knowledge is necessary when we try to analyze game
theoretic situations. However, it is also well-known that it differs slightly from
our practices of reasoning in everyday life. One of the problems pointed out by
Rubinstein [6] is known as the electronic-mail game problem.
Rubinstein [6] examines the situation where two agents are faced with a
coordination problem. They want to coordinate their actions in accordance
with the state of the nature, where two possible states, say a and b, of nature
are presupposed. One agent, say the agent 1, knows the information on the true
state while the other, say 2, doesn’t. They are located at mutually distanced
place and can communicate only by electronic mails. And e-mails are sent only
when the state is b. E-mails fail with a small probability. So simply sending
an e-mail doesn’t guarantee that it is received by the recipient. To confirm it,
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they must receive a reply. But here, the same problem arises again. They must
receive a reply to the reply to guarantee that the first reply is received by the
sender of the original message. The process never ends and replies must go
on forever before the original information becomes common knowledge. Then
Rubinstein shows us a claim: however hugely many times they send replies, the
information will never become common knowledge.
The situation can be put in Aumann’s framework as follows: let Ω be a
set of triples consisting of the state of the coordination game, a or b, and the
numbers, t and t′, of messages agent 1 and 2 sent respectively2. Then Ω consists
of (a, 0, 0) and (b, t, t′) in which t′ = t or t− 1. The information partition of two
agents are given as below:
P1 = {{(a, 0, 0)}, {(b, 1, 0), (b, 1, 1)}, {(b, 2, 1), (b, 2, 2)}, . . .},
P2 = {{(a, 0, 0), (b, 1, 0)}, {(b, 1, 1), (b, 2, 1)}, {(b, 2, 2), (b, 3, 2)}, . . .}.
The problem pointed out by the e-mail game is stated in this setting as: the
event B, which consists only of all the states whose first element is b, will never
be common knowledge no matter how many times the message will be sent3.
5 A Metric on State Spaces
The claim we just saw may not fit our intuition. Since, in most cases, we usually
don’t doubt that the event B is common knowledge after sending hugely many
replies each other.
This problem will be solved when we construct numbers based on AST. It
can be done by contracting the scope of reachability to finitely many steps. To
put it in more precise manner, let us first look into the detailed structure of
reachability.
To identify all reachable states, we define a function Li(A)
4, called link of
agent i from A, which indicates the set of all reachable states from A ⊆ Ω, given
agent i’s partition Pi as:
Li (A) ≡ {y ∈ Ω ; (∃x ∈ A)(y ∈ Pi(x))}.
We also define the operator LG(A) that indicates the link among agents of,
not only two but generally, G from A as:
LG (A) ≡
⋃
i∈G
Li (A) .
2 For example, (a, 0, 0) represents the state in which the state of the game is a and both
agents send no message, since the message will be sent only when the state is b.
On the other hand (b, 2, 1) represents the state in which the state of the game is b, the agent
1 sends 2 messages and the agent 2 sends just 1 message. The agent 1 sends 1st message since
the state of the game is b. The agent 2 received the original message since t′ = 1 meaning
that the agent 2 replied back. t = 2 also means that the agent 1 received the reply from the
agent 2 since the agent 1 sends the second message. But the agent 2 fails to receive the second
replay, since the agent 2 doesn’t send the third reply. Provided that the agent 2 received the
second reply, 2 must have sent back the third reply but it doesn’t.
3 The validity of this claim is easily checked. Evidently, all the elements of the information
partitions of two agents are reachable from each other. Therefore, the only event that can be
common knowledge is Ω. Since Ω includes (a, 0, 0), the event B cannot be common knowledge
even if hugely many messages are sent.
4This function can be defined by way of knowledge operator Ki : 2Ω → 2Ω, which we
examine later in the section Appendix B, as Li(A) = Ω \Ki(Ω \A).
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and define LnG(A) inductively as L
1
G(A) = LG(A) and L
n
G(A) = LG
(
Ln−1G (A)
)
.
For notational ease, we define L0G (A) as L
0
G (A) = A.
Let us make sure that for any two reachable states x and y, there exists an
n-step link between them.
Proposition 3. For any two mutually reachable states x, y ∈ Ω, there exists at
least one natural number n ∈ N which satisfies y ∈ LnG ({x}).
Proof. Let x and y are mutually reachable states. Since they are reachable,
there exist a natural number n ∈ N and sequence of subsets P1, . . . ,Pn ⊆ Ω,
which satisfies P1 = Pi(x) for some i ∈ G, Pℓ−1 ∩ Pℓ 6= ∅ and Pℓ ∈ Pj for
some j ∈ G for all ℓ ∈ {2, . . . , n}, and Pn = Pk(y) for some k ∈ G. Thus,
Pℓ ∈ LℓG({x}) for all ℓ and P
n ⊆ LnG ({x}). It implies y ∈ L
n
G ({x}).
LnG(A) has many other tractable properties. Let us display some of them.
Lemma 1. For any A ⊆ Ω, A ⊆ LG(A).
Proof. Since x ∈ Pi(x) for any x ∈ A and i ∈ G, A ⊆ Li(A) ⊆
⋃
i∈G Li(A).
Corollary 1. For any n ∈ N and A ⊆ Ω, LnG(A) ⊆ L
n+1
G (A).
Lemma 2. For any A,B ⊆ Ω, if A ⊆ B then LG(A) ⊆ LG(B).
Proof. For any y ∈ LG(A) there exists x ∈ A and i ∈ G which satisfies y ∈
Pi(x). Since x ∈ A ⊆ B, Pi(x) ⊆ LG(B). It implies y ∈ LG(B).
Lemma 3. For any given x ∈ Ω and n ∈ N , y ∈ LnG ({x}) implies x ∈ L
n
G ({y}).
Proof. If n = 0, it is trivially satisfied since y = x.
Suppose a ∈ Ln−1G ({b}) implies b ∈ L
n−1
G ({a}), and y ∈ L
n
G ({x}). Then,
there exists at least one z ∈ Ln−1G ({x}) which satisfies y ∈ LG ({z}). It implies
that there exists i ∈ G in which y ∈ Pi(z) holds, thus z ∈ Pi(y) and therefore
z ∈ LG ({y}). Applying the lemma 2 n − 1 times to {z} ⊆ LG ({y}) yields
that Ln−1G ({z}) ⊆ L
n
G ({y}). Then, z ∈ L
n−1
G ({x}) implies x ∈ L
n−1
G ({z}) ⊆
LnG ({y}).
We next define a metric function between two mutually reachable states
which indicates steps it takes from one state to the other. Let ||x, y|| = 0 iff
y ∈ L0G ({x}). If y /∈ L
0
G ({x}), then for each n ≥ 1
||x, y|| = n iff y ∈ LnG ({x}) \ L
n−1
G ({x})
It is evident that this is well-defined. Provided contrary that ||x, y|| = α
and ||x, y|| = β in which α < β, then both y ∈ LαG ({x}) and y /∈ L
β−1
G ({x})
must be satisfied at the same time. But by corollary 1 LαG ({x}) ⊆ L
β−1
G ({x}),
thus y must satisfy y ∈ Lβ−1G ({x}). It is contradiction.
Let us next confirm this function actually is a metric.
Proposition 4. A function ||·, ·|| is a metric.
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Proof. Since L0G ({x}) = {x}, ||x, y|| = 0 follows only when x = y is satisfied.
Symmetry follows from lemma 3. The case where ||x, y|| = 0 is trivial.
Suppose ||x, y|| = n > 0. Then y ∈ LnG ({x}) and y /∈ L
n−1
G ({x}) since y ∈
LnG ({x}) \ L
n−1
G ({x}). Thus x ∈ L
n
G(({y}) and x /∈ L
n−1
G ({y}) by lemma 3.
Thus, x ∈ LnG ({y}) \ L
n−1
G ({y}) and ||y, x|| = n.
Suppose ||x, y|| = ℓ and ||y, z|| = m. Let ||x, z|| = k > ℓ + m, then,
z ∈ LkG ({x}) \ L
k−1
G ({x}). By corollary 1, z /∈ L
v
G ({x}) for all v ≤ k −
1. But since ||x, y|| = ℓ, y ∈ LℓG ({x}). By the assumption ||y, z|| = m, it
follows z ∈ LmG ({y}). Therefore, it must be satisfied that z ∈ L
ℓ+m
G ({x}). It is
contradiction since ℓ+m ≤ k − 1.
6 Subjective Reachability
Now we can construct a sorites relation

↔ among group G’s perspective by
making use of this metric ||·, ·|| and define altered reachability as: x is subjec-
tively reachable from ω among the group G iff ω

↔x. Then, an event E’s being
common knowledge at ω among the group G can be restated accordingly as: E
is common knowledge iff gal(ω) ⊆ E, where gal(ω) represents a galaxy defined
by

↔.
With this slight alteration, the event B, which cannot be common knowledge
in Rubinstein [6], turns now to be common knowledge.
Proposition 5. Given the state of the game is b and hugely many, say α,
messages are sent, then the event B is common knowledge in AST environment.
Proof. It is sufficient to consider the case where the true state is (b, α, α), in
which the state of the game is b and both players sent α messages. Since
||(a, 0, 0), (b, α, α)|| = α and

↔ are sorites relations, ¬
(
(a, 0, 0)

↔(b, α, α)
)
and
(a, 0, 0) /∈ gal ((b, α, α)). Therefore, the event B contains gal((b, α, α)) as its
semiset and, thus, is common knowledge.
Besides this, the event B has come to have many interesting features which
the original one doesn’t have. Let us review two of them.
Proposition 6. If event B is common knowledge under the true state (b, τ, τ),
then it is also common knowledge under (b, τ − 1, τ − 1).
Proof. Since eventB is common knowledge under the state (b, τ, τ), ¬((a, 0, 0)

↔(b, τ, τ))
and thus, ¬((a, 0, 0)

↔(b, τ−1, τ−1)) by Proposition 2. Consequently, (a, 0, 0) /∈
gal((b, τ − 1, τ − 1)) and gal((b, τ − 1, τ − 1)) ⊆ B. Therefore, event B is also
common knowledge under the state (b, τ − 1, τ − 1).
Furthermore, the next property also holds.
Proposition 7. If event B is not common knowledge under the true state
(b, t, t), then it is also not common knowledge under (b, t+ 1, t+ 1).
Proof. Since eventB is not common knowledge under the state (b, t, t), (a, 0, 0)

↔(b, t, t)
and thus, (a, 0, 0)

↔(b, t + 1, t + 1) by Proposition 1. Consequently, (a, 0, 0) ∈
gal((b, t+ 1, t+ 1)) and gal((b, t+ 1, t+ 1)) * B. Therefore, event B is also not
common knowledge under the state (b, t+ 1, t+ 1).
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In short, these two properties tell us that it will not be changed whether the
event B is common knowledge or not, no matter how many times the number
of messages both players sent changes unless it is huge.
The result of Proposition 5 can be confirmed within the e-mail game set-
ting. Consequently, the other type of Nash equilibrium in this setting of AST
emerges in which both agents can coordinate to gain maximum payoff when
huge messages are sent. The payoff matrix of two coordination games are given
as follows:
The Game Ga
A B
A M, M 0, −L
B −L, 0 0, 0
state a
probability 1− p
The Game Gb
A B
A 0, 0 0, −L
B −L, 0 M, M
state b
probability p
As we saw, only agent 1 knows the true state, and e-mails are sent only when the
true state is B. Whenever each agent’s computer receives e-mails, it replies back
automatically, but fails with provability of ε > 0. Thus, both agents cannot tell
whether the opponents succeed or fail to receive the last e-mail. However, the
last proposition holds.
Proposition 8. There is a Nash equilibrium in which agent i plays A when the
agent sent huge number of e-mails and play B otherwise.
Si(t) =
{
A if t ∈ FN
B otherwise
Proof. When agent 1 receives finite number of e-mails, say t, then t− 1 is also
finite. Therefore, 2 plays A regardless of whether agent 2 succeed or fail to
receive 1’s t-th e-mail, and 1’s utility playing A is M while deviating to B
reduces it to −L. The argument is same for agent 2.
On the other hand, when agent 1 receives infinite number of e-mails, say τ ,
then τ − 1 is also infinite. Therefore, 2 plays B, and 1’s utility playing B is M
while deviating to A reduces it to 0. The argument is same for agent 2.
7 Concluding Remarks
We showed that once we adopt AST, it is possible to model the situation where
informations of an event are shared only through not so much stable e-mail
systems and become common knowledge, while it seems very hard, if not im-
possible, as long as we stick to the framework of ZF set theory.
As we saw, it is enabled by the way AST treats infinity: negation of the
axiom of infinity for sets but classes. However, AST is not the only framework
which enables us to model this kind of situation. In fact, this feature is shared
by at least two other frameworks: non-standard analysis [5] and alternative
mathematics [7].
For those who know non-standard analysis, it may seem quite natural and
easy to translate the arguments here to terminology of non-standard analysis.
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One can translate FN to N, a set of standard natural number, which is external,
and N to ∗N, a non-standard extension of N, which is internal5.
Being aware of that elements of ∗N \ N are infinite and reachable from ∅ by
induction, one can model the situation also within a framework of non-standard
analysis exactly the same way as we did, but, as long as we know, none has
been done6. This kind of research may open the door to a whole new way to
deal with the phenomena involving infinitely many repetition.
On the other hand, alternative mathematics is fairly a new framework orig-
inated by Tsujishita [7], aimed at founding a system of non-standard model of
arithmetic directly, without recourse to infinite set theory. To avoid unnecessary
complications, numbers and its arithmetic are simply presupposed, and essen-
tial constructions are very similar to those of AST but simpler and, in some
respect, more restrictive7.
Thus, it is also easy to translate the arguments here to alternative mathemat-
ics, namely by replacing FN to Nacc, a class of all accessible natural numbers,
and N to N, a class of all natural numbers.
As we saw briefly, the arguments we propose here can be dealt in multiple
frameworks, but only AST have been made a number of interesting researches
based upon this perspective. This is because AST is developed to offer the
very tools to investigate these kinds of phenomena right from the beginning
as compared with non-standard analysis, and old enough to develop various
tools as compared with alternative mathematics. So, trying to investigate the
phenomena involving infinity or indefiniteness, say, endless operations or huge
crowds, one can benefit a lot from their achievements and insights. Huge amount
of treasures are waiting to be excavated.
Appendix A Common knowledge as a meet
In the Section 4, we reviewed that the event is originally defined as common
knowledge in Aumann [1] when it include the event P1 ∧ P2(ω) which is an
element of the meet P1 ∧ P2. We didn’t discuss how the definition is stated
in this manner in AST environment in the main body. In this appendix, we
supplement it.
The conclusion is drawn from the next proposition.
Proposition 9. In AST setting, the meet of the group G,
∧
i∈G Pi coincides
5 Vopeˇnka [8] called the process of getting the set of all natural number N of “Cantor’s
Set Theory” critically as “complete sharpening”, and praised the attempt of non-standard
analysis, as it shares the goal with AST, to extend natural numbers beyond this completely
sharpened horizon of N. Despite the fact that they share the goal, the direction they extend
the horizon differs. While AST moves the horizon toward inside by dividing natural numbers
into two subclasses, that is, FN and N \ FN , non-standard analysis extend natural numbers
beyond the horizon N to non-standard one, that is, ∗N. As a result, every natural number of
ZF set theory remains finite in non-standard analysis, while a part of them are considered to
be infinite in AST.
6Vopeˇnka criticize this inactive attitude of non-standard analysis writing “the relation of
Non-standard Analysis to Cantor’s Set Theory is that of vassal, which is also reflected in the
name “non-standard” natural numbers and so on”.
7 One example is a condition that makes up classes. To be a class, every element of a
collection of objects must have “distinctiveness”. Semisets and proper classes are defined not
to have this distinctiveness, so that a collections of them cannot make up a class.
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with the class of all galaxies, or Ω/

↔ (the quotient of Ω by

↔).∧
i∈G
Pi = {gal(ω); ω ∈ Ω}
Proof. First we show that the class of all galaxies is partition.
By definition of galaxies, two galaxies of different states x and y are identical
or mutually disjoint. Provided that they are not disjoint, they share at least
one common element z ∈ gal(x) ∩ gal(y) which satisfies both z

↔x and z

↔ y.
By transitivity, x

↔ y follows. Consequently, gal(x) = gal(y) follows.
Since the class {gal(ω); ω ∈ Ω} is defined for all states, the union of all the
elements of the class trivially coincides with Ω.
Secondly, we show that this is the smallest class which is strictly coarser
than Pi for all i ∈ G. Provided that there exists A which is finer than
{gal(ω); ω ∈ Ω}, there must be an event A ∈ A which satisfies A ⊂ gal(ω)
for some ω ∈ Ω. It means there must be at least one state x ∈ gal(ω) \A which
satisfies Pn = Pi(x) ∈ Pi for some n ∈ FN and i ∈ G. It means x has an
n-step link from ω, which is contradiction.
Clearly from the proposition, the event E’s being common knowledge can
be stated the same way as Aumann [1] as P1∧P2(ω) ⊆ E, which coincides with
the definition we stated in the main body since P1 ∧P2(ω) = gal(ω).
It is worth mentioning that our definition of common knowledge and that
of the Aumann differ only when gal(ω) is proper semiset. When the gal(ω) is
a set, they coincide. It can be said alternatively that subjective and objective
perception differ when it takes hugely many steps to get objective evidence that
we both agree that we agree.
Appendix B Knowledge operator
One of the major ways to analyze structure of knowledge is via knowledge
operator [4, 2]. This operator can be represented making use of the link function.
We briefly sketch how.
A Knowledge operator is defined in [4, 2] as:
Ki(A) ≡ {ω ∈ Ω; Pi(ω) ⊆ A}
The statement ω ∈ Ki(A) means that the agent i knows the event A occurs at
ω.
The event indicated by this operator can also be interpreted as the set of
states which has no link from outside of A. In other words, the agent i cannot
build any link from within to the outside of A.
Proposition 10. The event indicated by Ki(A) coincides with the event which
has no link outside of A:
Ki(A) = Li
(
A
)
where A is complement of A, that is, A ≡ Ω \A.
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Proof. Suppose x ∈ Ki(A). It is equivalent to Pi(x) ⊆ A and therefore to
Pi(x) ∩ Li
(
A
)
= ∅.
Finally, it is equivalent to x ∈ Li
(
A
)
.
The operator KG(A) is defined as:
KG(A) ≡
⋂
i∈G
Ki (A) =
⋂
i∈G
Li
(
A
)
Then the class of all states at which every agent knows that A is common
knowledge can be stated as:
CG(A) ≡
{
ω ∈ Ω;
(
∀x ∈ A
) (
¬(x

↔ω)
)}
It means that CG(A) is subjectively unreachable from the outside of A.
Finally, the event A’s being common knowledge under the state ω comes to
coincide with the fact that the state is included in CG(A).
Proposition 11. gal(ω) ⊆ A iff ω ∈ CG(A)
Proof. gal(ω) ⊆ A is equivalent to the state ω’s being subjectively unreachable
from the outside of A. It is exactly what the statement ω ∈ CG(A) says.
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